CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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1952.

- In December 1952 the annual meeting of the representatives of northeastern industries and mines, called by the Northeast Department of Industry, ascertained the power setbacks suffered by the industrial plants and mines in the area as a result of the United Nations bombing raids on the Suiho hydro electric plant on the Yalu River on 23 June and 13 September 1952. The installations at Port Arthur, Dairen, Fushun and Anshan suffered a loss of 200,000 kilowatts of power. At the end of November the Electrical Industry Bureau of the Northeast Department of Industry reported to the Department of Industry that the electric power supplied throughout 1952 represented, by the end of November, 77 per cent of the projected output for
 - The area officials ordered the following short-term measures to increase the amount of available power by 120,000 kilowatts:
 - (1) Restriction of the use of electric power to heating and commercial purposes.
 - (2) Staggering of holidays among the various industrial plants and mines.
 - (3) Transfer of industrial plants that normally operate only during the day to an alternate day and night schedule.
 - They ordered the following long-term measures:
 - (1) Completion of power projects already underway.
 - (2) Procurement of small generators from Soviet Russia for allocation and sale to industrial plants and mines.
 - (3) Changing of power transmission routes within the existing framework.

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- (4) Construction of a large, centralized generating station.
- (5) Use of a superior-power electricity network (sic).
- (6) Installation of a long-distance power transmission apparatus.

By 1 December 1952 the first two long-term measures had been implemented and had provided approximately 45,000 kilowatts. Projects involved in the other long-term measures were to be completed in 1953.

- 2. As a result of the bombings only 21 of the 51 key industries fulfilled their projected production schedules for 1952. On 1 December the following statistics, indicating the production setbacks, were reported by the mines and industries in the area:
 - a. The coal industry had fulfilled 88.7 per cent of its 1952 production schedule. The Coal Mining Administration of the Northeast Department of Industry reported that 81.4 per cent of the scheduled production for the third quarter of 1952 was realized.
 - b. The steel ingot industry fulfilled 93.2 per cent.
 - c. The crude shale oil production was 81.25 per cent.
 - d. The machine tool industry fulfilled 68.5 per cent.
 - e. The air compressor industry fulfilled 26.5 per cent.
 - f. Production of petroleum was 22.8 per cent.
 - g. The air pressure pump industry fulfilled 19.3 per cent.
 - h. The mining industry fulfilled 15.9 per cent.
 - i. Common sorghum production was approximately 2,450,000 tons.
 - j. The 20 Machine Plant, Mukden, reported that 63.5 per cent of the plant's July production schedule had been realized; 53.58 per cent of the August schedule; 66.71 per cent of the September schedule; and 74.5 per cent of the October schedule.
 - k. The production of electric motors, steel equipment, pig iron and lorries also suffered from the power shortage.
- 3. In October 1952, at a meeting of the Northeast Department of Industry, officials of the department stated that winter weather was increasing the power difficulties for industries in the area.
- 4. The Northeast Department of Industry's statistical section reported the total production of iron and steel between I January and 20 December 1952 for mines and refineries under its jurisdiction as follows:
 - a. Crude iron: 2,145,000 tons.
 - b. Steel ingots (kang ting/6921/6928): 1,336,000 tons.

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c. Steel material (kang ts'ai/6921/2624): 821,000 tons.

The Chinese Communist production goals for these mines and refineries for 1952 were as follows:

- a. Crude iron: 2,300,000 tons.
- b. Steel ingots: 1,500,000 tons.
- c. Steel material: 1,000,000 tons.

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1. Comment. These figures make the production of steel ingots 69 per cent of the scheduled production or somewhat lower than the percentage reported in paragraph 2.

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